2 during the same period. Third, we demonstrate that the U.S. succeeded using the threat of sanctions to compensate -in fact, overcompensate -American companies. Finally, we show that the expropriation did not increase the Mexican government's petroleum revenues or the wages paid to Mexican oil workers.
The Decline of the Mexican Oil Industry
Mexican oil production declined monotonically between 1921 and 1933. The decline in output was not due to declines in investment or exploration. Under every available measure, investment peaked after output peaked. This is not consistent with the hypothesis that the companies cut back on investment from fear of future taxes or expropriation. It does, however, square with contemporary accounts of the invasion of Mexico's oil deposits by salt water. The deposits that had been tapped were not particularly large. It took only a few years for the sheets of salt water that lay beneath them to invade the petroleum. 2 
FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE
The oil companies kept searching for oil. They simply could not find enough to maintain their 1918-21 levels of production. Table 1 presents data on drilling. Exploration increased until 1926, but fewer and fewer new wells found oil. Even when the companies sank successful wells, the initial output per well continuously fell. At its peak in 1921, the average initial capacity of a new well was 3.7 million barrels per day (bpd). By 1924, the average initial capacity of new wells had fallen to 1.0 million bpd. By 1930, the average new well produced only 61,327 bpd. The combination resulted in, as one contemporary observer put it, "a very pronounced increase in the cost of obtaining a barrel of crude oil." 3 
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE
The one exception to the lack of new discoveries was the Poza Rica fields controlled by the Mexican Eagle Oil Company, also known as El Águila. Mexican Eagle discovered oil in the region in 1930, when it hit a gusher after attempting to re-drill a deep well that had been abandoned in 1927. Production started in 1932, but ran into a series of related problems. First, the cost of production at Poza Rica was higher than in the company's previous fields. In addition, the company needed to construct new pipelines for the fields to be viable. Second, roughly 41% of the new fields were located on federally-owned lands, requiring long negotiations with the government.
(The same applied to the company's need to exercise eminent domain for pipelines.) 4 Labor troubles and a commercial conflict over an older field with a small Mexican company further complicated development. A final arrangement wasn't reached with the federal government until May 1937: Mexican Eagle gained the right to exploit federal lands, in return for a 35% inkind federal royalty on the gross value of production. 5 Data on net investment levels follow the same pattern as the data on new wells. The financial statements of the major Mexican oil companies can be found in Moody's Manual of Investments, including the Mexican Petroleum Company, Mexican Eagle, Pan American Petroleum and Transport, the Mexico-Pánuco Oil Company, the Mexico Seaboard Oil Company, and the PennMex Fuel Company. These firms accounted for 76 percent of total output in 1918. 6 Table 2 presents an index of the nominal value of each firm's fixed assets, that is to say, their assets excluding cash, securities, loans to other firms, accounts receivable, and other liquid investments. 7 TABLE 2 AROUND HERE By 1931, every company in the sample was disinvesting. The only variance was the year in which investment peaked. Mexican Petroleum's investment peaked in 1924. Mexican Seaboard peaked in 1925, Mexico-Pánuco and Penn-Mex in 1930, and Mexican Eagle in 1931. (The latter firm's new investment at Poza Rica was not enough to compensate for disinvestment elsewhere.) The most extreme case came from Penn-Mex, which announced in May 1932 that is was shutting down its operations in Alvarez, Barra Sur de Tuxpan, and Veracruz, due to "diminishing production of the company's wells" and the "generally unfavorable petroleum situation in Mexico." 8 The data in Table 2 are generally consistent with the estimates made by the Mexican government of total investment in the oil industry. The estimates indicate a rapid run-up of investment from 1912 to 1924 -three years after production peaked -followed by an accelerating decline through 1936. (See Table 3.) TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 5 Since the royalty was paid in barrels of oil, the agreement was more akin to a modern productionsharing agreement than a true royalty. The federal share declined to 15% for low-quality crudes. See Cabrera, La Suprema Corte, pp. 64-65. The agreement did not go into effect until November 1937. " Business & Finance: Mexican Wages," Time Magazine, December 27, 1937. 6 Market shares were calculated from data in Brown, Oil and Revolution, p. 125. 7 We look at fixed assets (land, equipment, buildings) not total assets. The reason is that total assets can increase through the purchase of securities or increases in cash balances, without these assets being invested in productive apparatus. In fact, total assets can increase even if a firm is selling its productive assets and holding the proceeds as cash. Our figures are the book values of fixed assets, calculated at acquisition cost minus depreciation. Optimally, we would have converted these figures into replacement costs. This involves applying the same depreciation schedules across companies by asset type and adjusting the value of new acquisitions of productive apparatus for inflation. Unfortunately, many of our financial statements either lumped depreciation in with other expenses (making it difficult to back out) or failed to break down productive assets into sufficiently detailed sub-categories. 8 "Penn Mex Cuts Operations," Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1932. Since Mexico produced no oil drilling equipment, pipes, casings, or storage tanks, gross investment flows can be measured by the real value of oil equipment imported into Mexico from the United States. Figure 2 presents the data. New investment flows begin to decline in 1925, four years after output peaked. 9 They then fell through 1938, save for a brief uptick in 1932-34 as the Poza Rica fields came on-line.
FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE

The State of the Oil Companies
The implication of declining production and rising costs is that the Mexican oil industry should have been in increasing financial distress. The financial data for the companies bear out this implication. 50¢ in 1932; 75¢ in 1933, 1934, and 1935; 50¢ in 1936; and 30¢ in 1937 Did the Mexican government contribute to the oil companies' parlous financial state? The answer appears to be no. First, as discussed above, the oil companies continued to prospect for oil during the 1920s and 1930s. When they found it, as in Poza Rica, they invested. This is not consistent with a poor political environment. Second, Share prices of all oil companies, not just those exclusively operating in Mexico, rose and fell along with the price of petroleum. Oil prices fell from a peak of $26.10 per barrel in 1920 (in 2009 dollars) to $13.76 by 1923. They then recovered somewhat before beginning a long and painful slide to a low of $11.92 in 1932. (See Figure 4.) Might the Mexican government have engaged in creeping expropriation via the tax system? Gross receipts from petroleum taxes as a percentage of the value of crude oil production rose from a low of 15% of the gross value of crude oil production in 1925 to more than 30% by 1931. By the 1930s, however, production charges, export duties, royalties, and income taxes made up less than a third of oil taxes. The remainder came from oil import duties and excises on domestic sales of refined products, overwhelmingly gasoline. The burden of import duties, obviously, did not fall on Mexican oil producers. Gasoline excises might have fallen on crude producers, but for two factors. First, such charges came out of the value-added during the refining process, not the value of the crude itself. Second, the United States imposed no tariffs on oil or gasoline imports until 1932. If a foreign-owned Mexican refinery could not pass along the burden of excise taxes to consumers, it would simply choose to export. In fact, most of Mexico's production of refined products was exported. (See Figure 5 .) The maximum burden of Mexican refined product taxes was therefore equal to the cost of transporting refined products to the United States, which a Congressional report estimated to be $3.78 (in 2009 dollars) per barrel in 1931. 20 
FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE
A government action did reduce the value of the Mexican oil companies in 1933 … but the government in question was not Mexico's. Rather, the U.S. Congress imposed tariffs on imported oil. In 1930, Congress reported that refineries using imported oil earned a profit of 26¢ per barrel while refineries using domestic oil earned only 11¢. Despite the opening of the Panama Canal, which made it feasible for the first time to export Californian oil to the east, foreign oil was often cheaper in East Coast markets. The independent producers and refiners argued that the "Big Four" oil companies used their access to foreign oil as a club to "coerce the independent and to break American markets." Moreover, they presented evidence that the Big Four did not fully pass along the benefits of lower crude oil prices to consumers. In 1931, the governors of Oklahoma, Texas, Kansas and New Mexico urged President Hoover to impose "voluntary" import reductions on the oil companies. Jersey Standard, Standard Oil of Indiana, Gulf Oil and Sinclair agreed to voluntary reductions of a quarter, and Shell cut imports by half. (Since Shell controlled Mexican Eagle, this move particularly impacted its subsidiary.) Nonetheless, protectionist pressure continued to build -abetted by concern over budget deficits -and on June 6, 1932, President Hoover signed a bill that imposed tariffs of 21¢ per barrel on crude oil, $1.05 per barrel on gasoline, and $1.68 per barrel on lubricants. 21 The result was a doubling of the gap between the export price of Mexican crude and the New York price for oil of the same grade. (See Figure 4 .)
FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE
The Labor Disputes
The parlous state of oil company finances was on collision course with the increasing militancy of the oil unions. The unions saw some success at raising wages and cutting hours between 1915 and 1934. Strikes hit the Mexican Eagle refineries in Tampico in Minatitlán in April 1915, followed by a second set in 1916 and 1917. In May 1917 the labor unrest spread to Pierce's operations in Tampico and Mexican Petroleum's refinery in Mata Redonda. 22 The government of the state of Tamaulipas stepped in and settled the Pierce strike, mandating a 25% wage increase. 23 In June, Mexican Petroleum conceded the same benefits. 24 Mexican Eagle gave in to a 1924 strike, conceding an 8-hour workday, wage hikes, and the first collective bargaining agreement in the history of the Mexican industry. 25 One Mexican government report related, "Most workers do not agree with the movement and on various occasions told us that if most of them didn't return to work, it was from fear of becoming victims of the violence committed against the persons of some other workers." 26 The other companies soon signed similar contracts. 27
Follow-up strikes, however, met a more determined response, with the support of the Mexican government. Mexican Petroleum, for example, conceded a collective bargaining agreement to the Huasteca union after a 1925 strike. When workers from a competing union killed a Huasteca member in 1925, the union declared a second strike. With government support, management fired the striking workers. It then rehired only a third. 28 Mexican Eagle ended a refinery strike that same year by paying $123,000 to the leadership of the national Confederación Regional de Obreros Mexicanos (CROM), which got the strike declared illegal. 29 Nevertheless, overall, wage rates rose from 6¢ (U.S.) per hour in 1913 to 16¢ per hour in 1934. 21 McBeth, "Oil Industry," pp. 427-462. 22 Brown, "Sindicalización," p. 39. 
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The final wave of labor disputes began at Mexican Eagle in 1934. The company's union wanted a larger share of the returns from Poza Rica. President Abelardo Rodríguez mediated a settlement. 30 In the wake of the settlement, the various oil unions united into the Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros de la República Mexicana (STPRM), affiliated with the CROM. 31 A second set of strikes broke out against Mexican Petroleum in January 1935. According to American government observers, the company preferred to close its facilities "rather than compromise with the workers." 32 The Federal Labor Board (Junta Federal de Conciliación y Arbitraje) declared the strikes legal, but the Supreme Court reversed the decision.
The imposed labor peace did not last. On November 3, 1936, the STPRM demanded an $8.3 million wage hike, 18 paid holidays, 20 to 60 days paid vacation, health insurance, 25 days of severance pay for each year of service in the case of voluntary separation, and 90 days of severance in the case of involuntary separation. Moreover, the union demanded control over all hiring decisions, save for 110 positions across the entire industry. 33 The union demanded a response by November 17. (See Table 6 .)
TABLE 6 AROUND HERE
The oil companies did not react well. "The union draft contains over 250 clauses, covers 165 pages of legal-size script of which almost 40 embrace the wage schedule and took several months to formulate, and yet the companies were to 'discuss' and 'approve' the document in the peremptory period of 10 days." Moreover, they refused to give up control over hiring and firing. "Owing to the present restricted number of supervisory positions, the industry is already suffering the consequences of lack of control and discipline." 34 President Cárdenas intervened to contain the dispute. Talks dragged on until May 1937. Cárde-nas once again intervened to head off a strike, by appointing a special commission. On August 14, 1937, the commission reported that the companies could afford a wage increase of $7.3 million. A wildcat strike immediately broke out at Poza Rica. 35 Cárdenas ordered it stopped. 36 A second wildcat hit Mexican Eagle in September. An exasperated Cárdenas accused the workers of helping "capitalist interests" by turning the country against the labor movement. 37 The strike ended when the company agreed to pay the workers 75% of lost wages and paid the union leadership $6,944. 38 Finally, on March 2, 1938, the Federal Labor Board announced that it would grant the unions a $7.3 million wage hike and increased control over personnel decisions. The Supreme Court upheld the decision the next day.
Mexican Petroleum reacted by closing 23 wells, moving oil stored in the fields to the Tampico port (presumably for quick export), shutting down the Mata Redonda plant and sending a letter to every employee stating that it would be unable to comply with the Board's order. 39 The STPRM called for a national strike against the companies. The March 7 deadline fixed by the Federal Labor Board came and went. On March 14, the Labor Board warned that they needed a response from the company by the following day. On March 15, the companies reported that they could not comply. The Board responded by suspending all contracts. 40 With their pay contracts suspended, and a strike deadline looming, workers began to seize loading terminals and shut down pipelines. President Cárdenas faced the imminent collapse of Mexico's most important industry. 41 On March 18, 1938, Cárdenas announced the nationalization. "Under such conditions, it is urgent that the public authorities take adequate measures to prevent grave domestic disturbances due to the paralysis of transportation and industry, which would make it impossible to satisfy collective needs and supply the consumer goods needed by our population centers." 42 Could the companies have paid higher wages? Table 6 presents two estimates of the annual cost of the wage settlement: one from the Federal Labor Board and one from oil company accountants. According to company figures (taken from annual reports for Mexican Eagle, Mexican Petroleum, and Penn-Mex, and from figures compiled by the Mexican government from company accounts for the remainder) the oil companies earned $3.7 million in 1936. Eliminating depreciation and depletion expenditures implies a net cash flow of $7.0 million, less than the official estimate of the settlement.
TABLE 7 AROUND HERE
The Mexican government accused the companies of transfer pricing, and estimated their profits at $15.4 million. Mexican Eagle accounted for most of the difference between the companies' reported profits and the Mexican government's estimate. Mexican Eagle, however, was profitable by any measure. It could have paid the union demand out of its operating cash flow. The lowest estimate of the burden would have been 31% (using the government figures) and the highest 102% (using the company's). Even the low figure, however, would have been a substantial hit to the company's bottom line … and the high figure would have put the company into the red. For the other companies, the burden would have been higher. 
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The companies had additional reasons to go to the mattresses over the union demands. Most importantly, they did not want to lose the ability to hire and fire at will. The unions would gain greater leverage to make future demands, and management's ability to cut costs would be greatly reduced (or even eliminated). Second, many of the companies had profitable assets in the West Indies, Venezuela, and the United States. They wanted to maintain a reputation of refusing to give in to demands from militant unions. Jersey Standard, in particular, was losing money on its Mexican properties, it had little to lose from taking a hard line. Finally, the companies did not expect the government to react with nationalization. Rather, they expected the government to place their properties into some sort of temporary receivership. President Cár-denas, however, decided against doing so because he feared the consequences of "interminable legal proceedings." 43 In short, the oil companies made rational gambles. They gambled low-value assets against the probability that the unions or government would refuse to back down. For them, it was a good bet. First, the assets they gambled with were relatively low value. Second, the union demand was unaffordable. 44 Finally, they did not expect the government to react with nationalization.
The unions and government also behaved rationally. The primary union interest was not a wage increase. Rather, it was job security, the one thing that the companies were unwilling to grant. Union members rejected any attempt by the leadership to trade job security for higher wages. 45 Similarly, the government needed to maintain the stream of tax revenues generated by the oil industry. Once the unions took steps to shut down the industry, the government had to react. Nationalization was the easiest way to insure that the industry would remain productive … and score political points in the process.
Foreign Reaction
President Franklin Roosevelt had little sympathy for the oil companies. The Good Neighbor Policy eschewed intervention, and Roosevelt was ideologically sympathetic to labor and state control over natural resources.
The oil companies, however, had a number of tools at their disposal to involve the American administration regardless of its desires and ideological bent. First, they could mobilize public opinion. The U.S. ambassador to Mexico, Josephus Daniels, complained that the companies "started to build propaganda fires under the government to compel a return of the properties." 46 Jersey Standard, in particular, financed a large-scale campaign. The company distributed a wide array of free publications, from press releases to full-length books. Editorial cartoons distributed by Standard portrayed the expropriation as a direct assault on American interests, and 43 Gordon, Expropriation, p. 120. 44 By early 1938, the companies basically capitulated, offering a $6.5 million wage hike as long as they could retain complete control over staffing. The unions realized that the implication of the settlement would be large-scale layoffs. Brown, "Labor and State," pp. 26-27. 45 Brown, "Labor and State,", pp. 27-28. 46 Daniels Diplomat, p. 231.
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not just oil company property. 47 The New York Times reproduced Jersey Standard press releases almost verbatim. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the paper's editorial page also consistently called for "punitive" action against Mexico. 48 The companies also resorted to selective leaking, in order to tie the American government's hands. For example, when on March 28, 1938, Secretary of State Cordell Hull delivered a private note to the Mexican government requesting "fair, assured and effective compensation," the key phrase appeared in the next day's papers, where Hull's demand was described as "forceful." 49 Moreover, the companies' propaganda highlighted terrorist incidents and called for American tourists to stay away from Mexico. 50 The propaganda campaign had limited success. In 1938, Mexico's tourism receipts dropped by a third. 51 On the other hand, the American public did not seem to take much notice of events in Mexico. In December 1938, Gallup asked the following question: "Which (1938) news story do you consider most interesting?" The answers included the invasion of Czechoslovakia (23%), Nazi persecution (12%); Republican gains in Congress (10%), Corrigan's flight (7%), the Fair Labor Standards Act (6%), the New England hurricane (5%), the recession (5%), the World Series (5%), the Japanese invasion of China (4%), and labor unrest (4%). The oil expropriation did not make the cut. 52 This is not to say that Mexico's action enjoyed public support inside the United States. It is to say that public outrage was insufficiently large on its own to force the Roosevelt Administration to take action. Second, the oil companies could interfere with Mexico's oil exports. The boycott was largely coordinated by the companies. Only the government of the United Kingdom officially prohibited Mexican imports. (The U.K. could afford to do so because it enjoyed sufficient supplies from Iran and Venezuela. By 1938, Mexico provided only 2.1% of British oil imports, down from 10.1% in 1935. 53 The limiting factor for British oil imports was the capacity of the tanker fleet. 54 ) The U.S. State Department gave off ambivalent signals, and courts blocked private attempts to enforce the boycott. A federal district court dismissed a case accusing the Eastern States Petroleum Company of importing $1.7 million worth of Mexican oil rightfully belonging to Mexican Eagle. Belgian and Dutch courts decided similarly, based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In France, Mexican Eagle won a lower court decision, but an appellate court overturned it and forced the company to pay damages to French distributors who had been unable to take possession of their oil for ten months. (In fact, a state court in Alabama refused to prevent the Mexican 47 Huesca, "Propaganda War," p. 3. 48 Huesca, "Propaganda War," p. 15. 49 Huesca, "Propaganda War," p. 21. 50 Meyer, Mexico, p. 204. 51 Meyer, Mexico, p. 204. 52 Huesca, "Propaganda War," p. 23. 53 McBeth, British Oil Policy, p. 127. 54 Jayne, Oil, p. 165. consul from taking possession of expropriated oil tankers.) 55 Once it became clear that neither the courts nor the executive branch would enforce the sanctions, American middlemen began to import Mexican oil (at prices 12-15% below posted ones) and helped arrange barter deals to sell oil to Germany and Italy. 56 The fundamental problem with the boycott was not that it lacked government support -although that didn't help -it was that it was ultimately self-defeating. With domestic demand for fuel skyrocketing, Pemex generally succeeded in re-orienting itself around the domestic market. (See Figure 5. ) Real revenues didn't reach their 1937 peak until 1947, but the industry survived the boycott. By 1940, atttempts to extend the boycott to the United States and Cuba had collapsed; by 1943 the U.S. exempted Mexican oil from import quotas. Export revenue, however, did not recover, as the nationalized industry had discovered the lucrative domestic market. 57 FIGURE 5 AROUND HERE Third, the oil companies designed a political strategy designed to drag the U.S. government into pressuring Mexico. Neither the U.S. ambassador in Mexico City nor the President of the United States were particularly sympathetic to their cause. The most hostile official was Interior Secretary Harold Ickes. "If bad feelings should result in Central and South America as a result of the oil situation that exists just now with Mexico, it would be more expensive for us that the cost of all the oil in Mexico." 58 Moreover, Ickes feared that sanctions could cause the Mexican government to collapse, which would be far worse for American interests than the expropriation of some declining oil fields. 59 Josephus Daniels, the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, matched Ickes's hostility towards the companies, and wanted to promote Mexican prosperity. Understandably, he doubted that sanctions would accomplish that. 60 They were joined in their concerns by Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau. Morgenthau worried that economic instability in Mexico might push the Mexican government into allying with the Axis or turn towards Communism. 61 With Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles vacillating and an unsympathetic President in charge, the oil companies faced a hard time assembling a political coalition.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull provided the companies with an in. He was not a huge fan of the oil industry, but he did want to get a reciprocal trade agreement from the Mexican government. He was angry about a Mexican decision to increase tariffs on American exports, and he was easily persuaded of "the need to punish Mexico economically to gain its respect for American 55 Exteriores, Septiember de 1938 -Agosto de 1939 . Current law in the U.S. and Europe does allow foreign sovereigns to be sued in domestic courts, unless an arbitration proceeding is currently underway. 56 Powell, Mexican Petroleum, p. 113 . 57 Powell, Mexican Petroleum, p. 116 . 58 Ickes, Secret Diary, p. 352 . 59 Ickes, Secret Diary, p. 521. 60 Daniels to Roosevelt, 8/31/38, in the Josephus Daniels Papers #203, Southern Historical Collection, The Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 61 Jayne, Oil, p. 48. business before closer economic ties with the country could be achieved." 62 Under intense lobbying pressure from the oil companies, he crafted a plan designed to unite a divided executive branch around sanctions. 63 On March 26, 1938, he sent a note to Mexico that denounced expropriation without compensation. Second, he convinced Morgenthau to suspend treasury purchases of Mexican silver. The suspension was quickly followed by a reduction of support price from 45¢ to 43¢ an ounce. This was a huge blow: in 1936, the Mexican government earned 24% of its total revenues from silver sales, twice what it earned from oil taxes. 64 Why did Morgenthau agree to such draconian tactics? Simply put, he viewed the expropriation as a convenient excuse to suspend the Silver Purchase Act of 1934. (In this, he had Harry Dexter White's support.) 65 The Silver Purchase Act committed the Treasury to buying a fixed quantity of silver every year until silver stocks reached 25% of its total specie reserves or the silver price reached $1.29 an ounce. (In 1936, the U.S. began to purchase silver directly from the Mexican government.) Morgenthau was initially ambivalent about the act, because it allowed the Treasury to build up specie reserves that it could use to counteract Federal Reserve policy, but the concurrent Gold Stabilization Act of 1934 provided ample resources for his purposes. 66 Morgenthau carefully designed the silver policy to make it appear as though his hand was being forced by events in Mexico. First, the State Department announced the suspension, not Treasury. (State, unfortunately, undercut Morgenthau by pinning the decision to suspend silver purchases on him in a letter to President Cárdenas.) Second, Morgenthau well knew that suspending silver purchases would do little to harm Mexico, since it could still sell its silver on the open market at the U.S.-supported price. He also knew, however, that other countries would immediately start dumping their silver stockpiles in the world market once the policy was announced, fearing that the U.S. would try to punish Mexico by lowering its price support for the metal. Of course, if enough countries did that, the U.S. would have to lower the silver price or see taxpayers' money flow away to foreign central banks.
Memoria de la Secretaria de Relaciones
Spain complied with Morgenthau's prediction when its ambassador to the U.S. offered to sell 56 million ounces. Morgenthau called that "the last straw" and lowered the silver price. 67 Moreover, the price change dovetailed with President Roosevelt's legislative strategy. At the time of the Mexican expropriation, the Fair Labor Standards Act was bottled up in a House committee.
Once released and passed on the House floor, it would then need to face a conference committee. FDR could hold out a promise to re-institute price supports for domestic silver as a credible way to keep recalcitrant Nevadan legislators inside the New Deal coalition. 68 Morgenthau was hesitant to explicitly commit FDR to the strategy, so he sent a letter to the President while he was on vacation in Warm Springs, New York, stating simply that Morgenthau would interpret a lack of communication from Roosevelt as consent. 69 Hull's strategy kept the pressure on both the American government (to punish Mexico) and the Mexican government (to compensate the companies). Hull had served in Congress with Samuel McReynolds (D-TN) , the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and both had been judges back in Tennessee. 70 In January 1939, the same month that the oil companies first laid out their negotiating positions, McReynolds introduced a bill calling for an end to silver purchases which subsidized Mexico's economy. 71 Other congressmen, notably Martin Kennedy (D-NY) and Hamilton Fish (R-NY) also introduced anti-Mexico resolutions. Hull insured that the bills would not pass, since they would interfere with the negotiations between the Mexican government and the companies, but they served as a useful cudgel. 72 
Final Settlement
Hull got Mexico to the table; what he failed to anticipate was that the oil companies did not want compensation for their properties. After all, they knew that their Mexican properties were worth little. Rather, they wanted to set a precedent that would discourage other countries from attempting to alter oil concessions. This was not an abstract fear. Spain nationalized Jersey Standard's properties in 1927. (The U.S. companies received full compensation in 1928.) 73 In 1931, Uruguay established a state-owned oil refining and retailing company that drove down the private share of the market from 100% in 1931 to 50.2% by 1937. 74 In 1932, the Chilean government threatened expropriation, the advent of which was headed off only by a well-timed military coup. 75 In March 1937, the Bolivian government nationalized Jersey Standard's concessions. Further adding to the companies' fears, the U.S. State Department believed that the Argentine government was behind the move. 76 In 1939, the Chilean government under President Pedro Aguirre again proposed nationalization, but the Chilean congress demurred. 77 None of these investments had been particularly profitable, but the companies felt they needed to draw a line in the sand before nationalization threatened something lucrative.
The result was a long and drawn-out bit of kabuki. The companies demanded a long-term contract to operate the expropriated properties, after which they would turn them over to the Mexican government. They also insisted on compensation for lost revenues and wanted the agreement enshrined in a treaty with the United States. 78 Needless to say, the Mexican government did not find this acceptable. 79 President Cárdenas proposed compensation for the properties as they were valued in 1938. Alternatively, he suggested the formation of several Mexican oil consortia, in which the oil companies would have a financial interest equal to their interest in the expropriated properties, but over which the government would maintain control by appointing a majority of the directors. 80 (The initial draft of Cárdenas's second proposal seemed to offer the companies double compensation: payment for property and a financial stake in the new companies.) The Mexicans also wanted as short a contract as possible, because they feared that new technologies would reduce oil consumption in the future. 81 President Roosevelt briefly attempted to break the logjam by suggesting that the oil companies accept Cárdenas' proposal on a temporary basis with boards split between the companies and the government, but both sides demurred. 82 The U.S. then tried to pressure the companies into using the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration to settle their claims, which would have the advantage of excluding British companies. (By 1943, Washington's opinion over the wisdom of excluding Britain would change; by 1945 it would be reversed.) The companies refused. 83 In 1940, Sinclair Oil broke with the other companies. It accepted an offer of $8 million in compensation and 20 million barrels sold at a 25¢ per barrel discount off market prices. 84 Negotiations with the other American companies continued to drag.
By the middle of 1941, the Roosevelt Administration ran out of patience and effectively imposed a settlement. 85 Table 11 .) By that standard, the Mexican government fairly compensated Jersey Standard. (It should be noted that Jersey Standard succeeded in retaining control of most of Mexican Petroleum's liquid assets (which were held in U.S. banks) and the company's tanker fleet.) Brown, Oil and Revolution, pp. 152, 160-161, and Brown, "Foreign Oil Companies," p. 372. 88 Wall Street Journal, "N. J. Standard ʹ32 Net 1c a Share," May 19, 1933. 89 The interest rate on long-term corporate bonds was 5.1%. Officer, "Interest Rate." 90 In 1938, U.S. corporate tax brackets ran as follows: $0-$5, 000, 12.5%; $5, [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 000, 14%; $15, 000, 16%, and 19% for all income over $25, 000. See Taylor, "Tax Brackets, " p. 287 . There are reasons to believe that it might not have. First, the British government, unlike the American one, had fewer levers to use against Mexico beyond the oil boycott. Moreover, once London stopped buying Mexican oil, it feared that ending the boycott would anger its allies in Venezuela and Iran. The Venezuelan ambassador to Caracas reported that the government there would be "most disturbed if they had any reason to believe that [the U.K.] might resume oil buying in Mexico to the detriment of Venezuela." 91 London feared that an angry Venezuela might be tempted to try "squeezing us over the condition on which we purchase their oil." 92 Britain was sufficiently concerned enough about Iran that it agreed to make extra royalty payments of $6.6 million in 1939 and $17.7 million in 1940 and 1941 , in order to compensate Iran for a decision to maximize tanker use by restricting its exports to markets west of Suez. 93 In short, once Britain accidently benefitted Venezuela and Iran by shutting Mexican oil out of its market, it could not make any moves towards compromise without risking its relations with those governments. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was not happy with the situation -"I do not like giving the Shah and Venezuela a veto on our relations with anybody" -but it mattered little as long as Mexico showed little sign of compromise. 94 Second, Mexican Eagle's oilfields, unlike the American-owned ones, were most emphatically not in decline at the time of nationalization. They might be expected to produce significant income in the future. Mexico might not be willing to pay the fair market price for such potentially valuable properties.
Third, in 1938, the U.S. government had few reasons to care about protecting British investors in Mexico -in fact, rather the opposite. The U.S. weakened Britain's position by explicitly requesting that Britain re-establish relations with Mexico in 1941. Eden decided not to ask for anything from the Americans in return. The reason was that Eden wanted to secure future American cooperation against Hitler and. The U.S., he believed, would be more amenable if Whitehall refrained from bargaining over Mexico. 95 The U.K. reopened relations with Mexico on October 21, 1941. Charles Bateman, the new British minister to Mexico City, privately wrote that Eden had made a grave mistake, since it would now be impossible (he believed) for the Mexican government to make a better offer to a British company than it had made to American ones. 96 million. The book value of the company's assets in 1937 came to only $16.5 million. Considering that the settlement came to almost five times the latter amount, it would be hard to argue that the company was undercompensated for its properties. (See Table 11 .)
Winners and losers in Mexico
If the oil industry was in decline in 1938, and U.S. pressure forced the Mexican government to fairly compensate the companies, then the oil nationalization should not have produced windfall rents for the Mexican government. At first glance, the evidence does not appear to be consistent with the above hypothesis: Mexican government revenue from oil increased significantly after the nationalization. (See Figure 7. ) Most of that increase, however, came from higher revenues from the excise tax on gasoline, which the government hiked from 8 centavos to 9 centavos in 1940, and then again to 10 centavos in 1946. 100 In the first eight years after nationalization, only in 1941 did real government revenues from the oil industry (other than excise taxes) exceed pre-nationalization payments. (In 1940, Pemex's poor financial situation forced the government to grant the company a subsidy of 60 million. 101 ) The nationalized industry only began to produce more for the government than had the old companies after loans from the U.S. ExportIncome Bank allowed Pemex to expand production from the Poza Rica fields. (See Figure 6. ) One might argue that rising excise tax revenues were a result of the British boycott of Mexican oil (see Figure 5 ), but that would be an odd benefit to attribute to the expropriation.
FIGURE 7 AROUND HERE
Did the oil workers gain from the expropriation? The government rejected union demands to directly manage the industry. 102 (Worker control was not unprecedented in Mexico: the unions managed the national railroads.) Wages rose slightly, and the work week fell from 44 hours to 40, but management refused to fully implement the December 1937 labor award. In January 1940, the unions asked that it be fully implemented. Vicente Cortés Herrera, Pemex's the general manager, replied by accusing the workers of lax discipline and "removing" company equipment. President Cárdenas had to personally intervene. He called on workers to allow management to suspend the labor award "until such time as the industry could pay off the indemnification and modernize its equipment." 103 After a strike scare, a labor ruling on November 28, 1940, allowed management to fire workers hired after the nationalization and reduce the wages of workers earning over 700 per month. 104 Nominal wages rapidly, but continuing inflation eroded the gains. By 1944, real compensation was little different than it had been in 1937. (See Table 12 .) The largest sustained gains for labor arrived in the form of a rapid expansion of the company's workforce, although the new jobs lacked job security.
TABLE 12 AROUND HERE
Conclusion
The Mexican oil expropriation of 1938 is often viewed as the harbinger of two defining characteristics of the modern age. First, the end of empire. The United States chose not to employ all elements of its national power in defense of its economic interests. Rather, it respected the rights of a fellow sovereign nation to control its own economic policies. What could have been decided by force or sanctions was instead worked out through negotiations inside the ambit of international law. Second, resource nationalism. Mexico took over not only the rights to its subsoil resources; it established the first of the great national oil companies that would come to dominate the world's energy scene. Moreover, the country seized control of a large-scale source of rents that it could use to develop the country … and in turn ushered in an era of weakened property rights across what would become known as the Third World. Before 1938, foreign investors in natural resources believed that their rights would be respected, and they would be compensated for any government takings; after, all bargains were obsolescing ones.
Like most stereotypes, there is a core of truth to the above characterization. The Roosevelt Administration was hesitant to intervene against Mexico. The Mexican government did establish the first of the great national oil companies. But beyond that, the actual historical record diverges substantially from the accepted view. The U.S. government ultimately intervened to defend the property rights of American (and allied) companies. The Mexican government, in turn, compensated the companies for their properties at more than their market value. The nationalization itself was the product of an out-of-control labor dispute, rather than a grand plan, and the companies were not particularly profitable. Neither the Mexican government nor the oil workers benefitted particularly much from the nationalization.
The expropriation of 1938 took place in a context rather different from today's, but not for the reasons that historians believe. Rather, the key difference between the environment of the 1930s and today is that in the 1930s, domestic courts still refused to use their authority against foreign governments. Today, that is no longer the case. Modern versions of 1938 play out differently not for reasons of ideology or relative power, but for an accumulation of small deliberate changes that have judicialized such disputes. 1938 was not the harbinger of a new age; rather, it was one of the latter gasps of an old one. 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1000s of barrels Mexican data from Haber, Maurer, and Razo, "Mexican Industry," p. 10. US data, 1911-12 
